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The Helms-Burton Act: A Legal and 
Effective Vehicle for Redressing U.s. 
Property Claims in Cuba and Accelerating 
the Demise of the Castro Regime 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 9, 1995, u.s. Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) 
and U.S. Representative Dan Burton (R-Indiana) co-sponsored the 
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995 (Helms-Burton 
Act).1 Designed to discourage foreign investment in Cuba and to has-
ten the demise of Fidel Castro's communist regime, the Helms-Burton 
Act set out: 
(1) to assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom and 
prosperity, as well as in joining the community of democratic 
countries that are flourishing in the Western hemisphere; 
(2) to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro 
government; 
(3) to provide for the continued national security of the 
United States in the face of continuing threats from the 
Castro government of terrorism, theft of property from Unit-
ed States nationals by the Castro government, and the politi-
cal manipulation by the Castro government of the desire of 
Cubans to escape that results in mass migration to the United 
States; 
(4) to encourage the holding of free and fair democratic 
elections in Cuba, conducted under the supervision of inter-
nationally recognized observers; 
(5) to provide a policy framework for United States support 
to the Cuban people in response to the formation of a tran-
sition government or a democratically elected government in 
Cuba; and 
(6) to protect United States nationals against confiscatory 
1 See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-14, 110 Stat. 785 
(1996) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act]. 
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takings and the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated 
by the Castro regime.2 
The Helms-Burton Act is comprised of four broad titles dealing with 
different aspects of U.S. relations with Cuba.s Title I contains provi-
sions aimed at tightening the economic embargo against Cuba.4 These 
provisions include a prohibition on the importation and commercial 
exchange of merchandise that has been transported, located, or de-
rived in whole or in part of any article which is the growth, produce, 
or manufacture of Cuba; a denial of foreign aid to independent states 
of the former Soviet Union found to be providing support for military 
and intelligence facilities located in Cuba; a prohibition against indi-
rect financing of Cuba; and opposition to Cuban membership in in-
ternational financial institutions.5 Title II outlines future U.S. policy 
toward Cuba upon the demise of Castro's communist regime.6 More 
specifically, Title II deals with U.S. policy toward a transition govern-
ment and an eventual democratically elected government in Cuba; 
assistance for the Cuban people; coordination of assistance programs; 
termination of the economic embargo of Cuba; and settlement of 
outstanding U.S. claims to confiscated property in Cuba.7 Title III, the 
most controversial provision of the Helms-Burton Act, states that "any 
person that ... traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban 
government on or after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United 
States national who owns the claim to such property for money dam-
ages."8 Lastly, Title IV provides for the exclusion from the United States 
2 [d. § 3, 110 Stat. at 788-89. 
5 See id. 110 Stat. at 785-86. 
4 See id. tit. I, § 101-16, 110 Stat. at 791-805. 
5 See id. 
6 See Helms-Burton Act, tit. II, § 201-07, 110 Stat. at 805-14. 
7 See id. 
S See id. tit. III, § 302(a)(I), 110 Stat. at 815. Damage awards under Section 302 are calculated 
as follows: 
SEC. 302. UABILITY FOR TRAFFICKING IN CONFISCATED PROPERTY ClAIMED 
BY UNITED STATES NATIONALS. 
(a) CIVIL REMEDY. 
(1) LIABILITY FOR TRAFFICKING. 
(A) ... money damages in an amount equal to the sum of: 
(i) the amount of which is the greater of: 
(I) the amount, if any, certified to the claimant by the Foreign Claims Settlement 
Commission under the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, plus interest; 
(II) the amount determined under section 303 (a) (2), plus interest; or 
(III) the fair market value of that property, calculated as being either the current value 
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of aliens who have confiscated property of U.S. nationals or who traffic 
in such property.9 
Opponents of the Helms-Burton Act have been especially critical of 
Titles III and N of the Act. lO Creating a cause of action for U.S. 
nationals against those individuals or corporations trafficking in confis-
cated property, opponents charge, amounts to unreasonable extrater-
ritorial legislation since the act of trafficking occurs entirely outside 
the United States,u In addition, opponents claim that this provision 
will lead to an unmanageable flood of Ii tigation: the claims of approxi-
mately 5,911 U.S. companies and individuals to property seized by the 
Castro government during the 1959 revolution total about $6 billion,12 
Similarly, opponents claim that Title N's provision denying visas to 
executives of corporations trafficking in confiscated property, as well 
as their families and agents, represents an unacceptable extension of 
U.S. law.13 Despite vocal opposition to the bill, President Clinton signed 
Id. 
of the property, or the value of the property when confiscated plus interest, whichever 
is greater; and 
(ii) court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
(B) Interest under subparagraph (A) (i) shall be at the rate set forth in section 1961 of 
title 28, United States Code, computed by the court from the date of confiscation of the 
property involved to the date on which the action is brought under this subsection. 
9 See id. tit. IV, § 401, 11 0 Stat. at 822-24. In relevant part, Title IV, Section 401 states: 
[d. 
(a) GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION. The Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the 
Attorney General shall exclude from the United States, any alien who the Secretary of 
State determines is a person who, after the date of the enactment of this Act: 
(1) has confiscated, or had directed or overseen the confiscation of, property a claim 
to which is owned by a United States national, or converts or has converted for personal 
gain confiscated property, a claim to which is owned by a United States national; 
(2) traffics in confiscated property, a claim to which is owned by a United States national; 
(3) is a corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a controlling interest of an entity 
which has been involved in the confiscation of property or trafficking in confiscated 
property, a claim to which is owned by a United States national; or 
(4) is a spouse, minor child, or agent ofa person excludable under paragraph (I), (2), 
or (3). 
10 See Saturnino E. Lucio, II, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (UBERTAD) Act of 
1995: An Initial Analysis, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 325, 327-38 (1996). 
II See Jonathan R. Ratchik, Note and Comment, Cuban Liberty and the Democratic Solidarity Act 
of 1995,11 AM. U.]. INT'L L. & POL'y 343, 363-64 (1996). 
12 See George Stuteville, Clinton to Re-Examine Helms-Burton Provision, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 
9, 1996, at AO!. 
U See Shari-Ellen Bourque, The Rlegality of the Cuban Embargo in the Current International 
System, 13 B.U. INT'L LJ. 191,211-15 (1995). 
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the Helms-Burton Act into law on March 12, 1996, in the aftermath of 
Cuba's brutal attack on two unarmed U.S. civilian aircraft over inter-
national waters which resulted in the deaths of four anti-Castro Cubans 
living in Florida. I4 President Clinton, however, conditioned his enact-
ment of the law upon the inclusion of a provision in the bill which 
would enable him to suspend the implementation of Title Ill's creation 
of a cause of action against those individuals and corporations traffick-
ing in confiscated property.I5 Hence, Title III, Section 306, of the 
enacted law empowers the President to suspend the effective date of 
Title Ill's cause of action provision if he determines that the suspen-
sion is necessary to U.S. national interests and will expedite the rise 
of democracy in Cuba. I6 As the expiration of the initial suspension 
neared, President Clinton opted to utilize Section 306 to suspend the 
implementation of the Title III cause of action for an additional six 
months. President Clinton conditioned this suspension upon contin-
ued efforts by U.S. allies to promote democracy and human rights in 
Cuba. I7 
The Cuban government's confiscation of a sizable amount of prop-
erty belonging to U.S. nationals, as well as Cuban citizens, during the 
first decade of the Cuban Revolution has never been directly addressed 
by the U.S. government, which has opted instead to use economic 
pressure tactics. IS The Helms-Burton Act represents a principled, un-
wavering stance against Cuba's illegal seizure of U.S. property, a clear 
14 See Steven Lee Myers, One Key Element in Anti-Cuba Law Post paned Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
4, 1997, avaiklble in LEXlS, Intlaw Library, Curnws File. 
15 See John F. Harris, Clinton Deklys Effect of Cuba Lawsuit Act; Battle With Trading Partners 
Averted, WASH. POST, July 17, 1996, avaiklble in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Curnws File. ''President 
Clinton decided yesterday that averting a confrontation with U.S. trading partners was more 
important than imposing sanctions on foreign firms operating in Cuba. He delayed by at least 
six months the effective start of a new law that leaves such businesses open to lawsuits in federal 
courts." [d. 
16 See Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. at 821-22. Title III, Section 306(b)(2) states: 
[d. 
The President may suspend the effective date under subsection (a) for additional 
periods of not more than 6 months each ... if the President determines and reports in 
writing to the appropriate congressional committees at least 15 days before the date on 
which the additional suspension is to begin that the suspension is necessary to the 
national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in 
Cuba. 
17 See Susan Riggs, Will Obscure Canadian Law Bring U.S. Policy to Heel?; Ottawa Fights U.S. 
Ban on Trading With Cuba, BALTIMORE SUN,Jan. 5,1997, at 5F. 
18 See Ratchik, supra note 11, at 344-47. 
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violation of international law, and punishes those individuals and cor-
porations who are currently reaping benefits from this stolen prop-
erty.19 In addition, the Helms-Burton Act, with its strengthening of the 
U.S. embargo against Cuba, seeks to accelerate the demise of Fidel 
Castro's regime which has blatantly violated basic human rights and 
has adamantly opposed any form of democracy.2o Despite its goals of 
protecting U.S. property interests abroad, upholding human rights in 
Cuba, and accelerating the advent of democracy in Cuba, the Helms-
Burton Act has been heavily criticized by members of the international 
community.21 
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of Cuba's expropriation 
of U.S. property. Part II discusses both the intended and unintended 
effects that the Helms-Burton Act has had upon Cuba. Part III explores 
international reaction to the Act. Part IV provides an in-depth analysis 
of the Helms-Burton Act, focusing specifically on its constitutionality, 
its validity under international law, and its consistency with U.S. trade 
agreements. This Note concludes that the Helms-Burton Act is both a 
legal and effective vehicle for redressing U.s. property claims, bringing 
an end to Castro's human rights abuses, and expediting the rise of 
democracy in Cuba. 
I. HISTORY OF CUBA'S EXPROPRIATION OF U.S. PROPERTY IN CUBA 
With Fidel Castro's rise to power in 1959 came a fundamental shift 
in the Cuban economy from capitalism to communism.22 Early in the 
Castro years, Cuba and the Soviet Union developed a relationship 
of comradery and cooperation.23 Initially, Communist party members 
gradually assumed government positions.24 Next, Cuba and the Soviet 
Union completed their first commercial transaction in 1960 when 
Cuba received Soviet oil in exchange for sugar. 25 In addition to becom-
ing one of Cuba's trading partners, the Soviet Union provided Cuba 
19 See id. at 346. 
20 See id. at 372-73; see also Lucio, supra note 10, at 326. 
21 See Holger Jensen, Castro Defies U.S. Policy With Most Nations' OK, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, 
Nov. 28,1996, at 56A; Steven Lee Myers, Eurape's Callfor Rights in Cuba Lets U.S. Off Hook, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1996, at A6; Riggs, supra note 17, at 5F. 
22 See Bourque, supra note 13, at 195-96; Ratchik, supra note 11, at 344. 
23 See Bourque, supra note 13, at 196. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
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with "low credit loans, technical advancements, and a steady supply of 
crude and refined petroleum. "26 
As Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union improved, the United 
States' relations with Cuba gradually deteriorated.27 With the adoption 
of the Fundamental Law of the Republic, the Cuban Government 
established a statutory basis for its confiscatory measures.28 Under the 
redistributive Agra Reform Law (LRA), foreign property owners lost 
their land to the Cuban government which in turn divided the prop-
erty into "small and medium-size farms, co-operatives, and special 
development acreages."29 Mter these confiscations, the United States 
expressed its concern that such takings must be coupled with the 
corresponding payment of "prompt, adequate, and effective com pen-
sation."30 
U.S.-Cuba relations deteriorated even further when, beginning on 
October 26, 1959, the Cuban government adopted legislation which 
required the re-registration of mining claims, and passed a new petro-
leum law.31 In addition, on May 17, 1960, upon the refusal of U.S.-
owned oil refineries to follow Cuban demands and process Soviet oil, 
the Cuban government seized the refineries.32 In retribution, the U.S. 
Congress amended the Sugar Act of 1948, thereby vesting in the Presi-
dent authority to establish a Cuban sugar quota.33 Before President 
Eisenhower could announce his decision to suspend Cuba's sugar 
quota, however, the Cuban government authorized the expropriation 
of U.S.-owned property.34 This decree represented a clear violation of 
26 See id. 
27 See Ratchik, supra note 11, at 345. 
28 See id. at 344. 
29 See id. at 344-45 & n.15. 
~o See id. at 345 & n.17. 
~l See id. at 345. 
~2 See Ratchik, supra note 11, at 346. This confiscation episode involved a Texaco company 
refinery. One of Texaco's refineries located in Cuba refused to refine oil received from the Soviet 
Union. In response, the Cuban Government confiscated all of the company's assets located on 
the island. In addition, the Cuban Government took over the assets of Esso and Shell companies 
the next day. See Bourque, supra note 13, at 196 & n.28, citing ROBERT E. QUIRK, FIDEL CASTRO: 
THE FULL STORY OF HIS RISE TO POWER, HIS REGIME, HIS ALLIES, AND HIS ADVERSARIES 209, 
31S-19 (1993). 
~~ See Ratchik, supra note 11, at 346. 
~4 See id. at 346. In Proclamation No. 3355, President Eisenhower reduced Cuba's remaining 
sugar quota from 739,752 tons to 39,752 tons. See id. at 346 n.26, citing Proclamation No. 3355, 
25 Fed. Reg. 6414 (1960). In a calculated move, Castro amended "Article 24 of the Cuban 
Constitution to allow for confiscation 'by competent authority' and for a cause of 'national 
interest'" one day before the enactment of the expropriation decree. See id. at 346 n.27. In 
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international law with respect to the taking of property.35 Despite vocal 
U.S. opposition to the expropriation decree, on October 13, 1960, the 
Cuban government enacted two more confiscatory measures aimed at 
expropriating the remaining significant foreign-owned businesses and 
some Cuban companies.36 
Faced with blatant aggression toward U.S. property interests in Cuba, 
Congress responded by enacting the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
which empowered the President to impose an economic embargo 
against Cuba.37 Coupled with the economic embargo, the Cuban Assets 
Control Regulations hindered Cuba's ability to access its assets located 
in the United States and prohibited U.S. citizens and corporations 
from maintaining business relationships with Cuba.38 Lastly, Congress 
attempted to ascertain U.S. property claims against Cuba and al-
lowed U.S. nationals to bring such property claims against the Cuban 
government under the amended International Claims Settlement Act 
of 1948.39 Cuba, however, never compensated any of the claimants.4o 
By the end of 1962, the U.S. stance toward Cuba had shifted from that 
of trading partner and political ally to that of economic and political 
enemy,4l 
The severing of political and economic ties with the United States 
coupled with a struggling economy had grave consequences for Cuba.42 
Deprived of U.S. machinery and supplies for transportation, mining, 
communications, and utilities, Cuban businesses, unable to obtain 
replacement parts and deprived of vital U.S. raw materials, flounder-
ed.43 While Cuban economic production dwindled, the United States 
remained steadfast in its isolationist policy toward Cuba since lifting 
the embargo in any way would have been interpreted as a weakness of 
U.S. resolve in the eyes of Marxist-Leninist regimes in Latin America.44 
Cuba's worries did not end here. Under U.S. pressure, the Organiza-
justitying its enactment of the expropriation decree, the Cuban Government cited "'economic 
and political aggression on the part of the United States' as its motivation for adopting the 
expropriating measure." See id. 
35 See id. at 346. 
36 See id. at 347. 
37 See id. 
38 See Ratchik, supra note 11, at 347. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See Bourque, supra note 13, at 197. 
42 See id. at 198. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. 
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tion of American States (OAS) expelled Cuba from its membership, 
thereby creating a regional trade boycott of Cuba by all Latin American 
countries with the exception of Mexico.45 
In the 1970s, U.S.-Cuba relations continued to deteriorate when, 
contrary to U.S. opposition, Cuba intervened in Angola.46 Consequent-
ly, the United States instituted a strict travel ban against Cuba, effec-
tively ceasing all foreign trade with the Cuban economyY During his 
two-term administration, President Reagan employed stringent policies 
to frustrate Cuban debt negotiations, urged U.S. corporations located 
abroad to avoid trading with Cuba, and called upon U.S. nationals to 
refrain from sending supplies and other items to Cuba.48 
II. EFFECTS OF THE HELMS- BURTON ACT 
Since its enactment, the Helms-Burton Act has affected Cuba in both 
intended and unintended ways.49 As intended, the Helms-Burton Act 
has already begun to stem the tide of investment and financial assis-
tance to Cuba.50 Despite President Clinton's suspension of Title III, 
threats of lawsuits and sanctions under Helms-Burton have inflicted 
m::yor blows to Cuba's economyY U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce 
Stuart E. Eizenstat pointed out that on at least twelve occasions, activi-
ties on confiscated property have come to abrupt halts out of fear of 
legal action.52 Foreign companies have become astutely aware of the 
implications of occupying, dealing in, or profiting from confiscated 
properties.53 This recognition was evidenced by two Spanish firms in-
volved in tobacco marketing and hotels that notified the U.S. State 
Department that their respective businesses did not involve disputed 
U.S. properties. 54 
45 See id. 
46 See Bourque, supra note 13, at 199. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. 
49 See Stuteville, supra note 12, at A01; Thomas Oliphant, Gaining Leverage in Cuba, BOSTON 
GLOBE,Jan. 7, 1997, at A15. 
50 See Stuteville, supra note 12, at AOl. 
51 See id. 
52 See Stanley Meisler, Clinton Extends His Suspension of Anti-Castro Law Another 6 Months; 
Caribbean: President Says Allies' Own Pressure On Cuba Justifies Postponing Permission For Americans 
To Sue Foreign Firms Doing Business There, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1997, at A6. Eizenstat cited the 
decision of the Mexican-owned company CEMEX, one of the world's largest cement companies, 
to withdraw an investment from Cuba. See id. 
53 See Stuteville, supra note 12, at AOl. 
54 See id. 
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In addition, several European banks have decided to withdraw loans 
to Cuba, effectively depriving Cuba of the necessary capital to harvest 
its sugar crops-"a critical component of the country's economy."55 
Numerous countries simply have reconsidered their intentions to in-
vest in Cuba.56 For instance, the Dutch bank INC and Spanish firm 
Banco Bilboa Vizcaya recently withdrew financing packages totalling 
nearly $60 million a year.57 Furthermore, two European countries that 
sell both Cuban sugar and sweeteners derived from it have terminated 
all business relations with Cuba and have notified the U.S. State De-
partment.58 
Thus far, the United States has sanctioned only two companies under 
the Helms-Burton Act.59 The United States denied the principals of the 
Sherritt International Corporation, a Canadian mining company, and 
their immediate families, permission to enter the country, in response 
to the corporation's operation of a nickel mine previously owned by 
Freeport-MacMoran Inc., of New Orleans.60 The United States imposed 
the same punishment on the Mexican telecommunications conglom-
erate Crupo Domos for using Cuban properties formerly owned by the 
lIT Corporation.61 The U.S. government meted out both of these 
penalties under Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act.62 
The Helms-Burton Act has adversely affected Cuba, inflicting in-
creasing economic pressure on an already struggling economy.63 The 
pool of potential lending institutions as well as previously reliable 
capital sources has grown smaller in light of potential sanctions under 
Helms-Burton.64 In this respect, Helms-Burton has curtailed the Cu-
ban government's ability to undertake new educational, infrastructu-
ral, and health projects.65 These new economic hardships created by 
Helms-Burton threaten to jeopardize the "social contract" that "holds 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See Stuteville, supra note 12, at AOI. 
59 See id. 
60 See Arthur Golden, Accounts Receivable After 37 Years, u.s. Says Cuba Owes Americans $5.6 
Billion U.S. Claims Against Cuba for Seized Property Amount to Almost Four Times Cuba's Annual 
Export Earnings, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Sept. 22, 1996, at 1-1. 
61 See id. 
62 See Stuteville, supra note 12, at AOI.; see also Helms-Burton Act, 110 Stat. at 822-24. 
63 See Stefan Halper, Castro's Flickering Revolution, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 19, 1996, at 
18. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
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the Cuban government responsible for health, education, housing, 
and food in return for the citizens' loyal support. "66 Such a rift between 
the Cuban government and the citizenry is exactly what Helms-Burton 
envisaged as a way of bringing an end to the Castro regime.67 
On the other hand, the Helms-Burton Act has seemingly had some 
unintended effects.68 According to John Kavulich, chairman of the 
independent and non-partisan U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Coun-
cil in New York, Cuba has obtained the necessary funding for its 
sugar harvest activities from other sources.69 Kavulich claims that none 
of the 5,911 businesses and corporations entitled to bring claims under 
Helms-Burton have indicated an intent to do SO.70 For the time being, 
Cuba's socialist economy has prevented the Act's impact from being 
felt by average Cubans.71 Thus far, critics claim that the tightening of 
the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba has neither made rationed goods 
scarcer, nor the exorbitant prices of goods sold exclusively for U.S. 
dollars higher.72 Although critics claim that the current hardships of 
Cuban citizens have not created widespread discontent with Castro's 
government, it is important to note that citizens are wary of openly 
discussing such problems under an authoritarian regime that censors 
the press, restricts access to the ballot boxes, and harshly punishes its 
critics. 73 
III. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC REACTION TO THE 
HELMS-BURTON ACT 
A. International Reaction to Helms-Burton 
Shortly after the passage of the Helms-Burton Act, U.S. allies around 
the globe expressed their opposition to the Act. 74 These countries and 
organizations have responded to Helms-Burton in various ways.75 The 
66 See id. 
67 See id.; Helms-Burton Act, § 3(1), 110 Stat. at 788-89. 
68 See Stuteville, supra note 12, at AOl. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
71 See Diane Bartz, Cubans Face New Year, Old Embargo and Familiar Hardships, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL,Jan. 5,1997, at G5. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
74 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. lNT'L L. 419, 
432 (1996) [hereinafter Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba]. 
75 See id. 
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remainder of this sub-section addresses their concerns and counter-
measures. 
1. United Nations (U.N.) 
On November 12, 1996, the U.N. General Assembly demonstrated 
the widespread opposition to Helms-Burton when it overwhelmingly 
approved a resolution urging the United States to end its 34-year 
embargo against Castro's regime.76 The vote, 138-3 with 25 absten-
tions, called upon the United States to repeal Helms-Burton and to 
end the embargo.77 Only Israel and Uzbekistan joined the United 
States in voting against the resolution.78 
2. The European Union (EU) 
The EU, an influential voting bloc within the U.N., has been con-
siderably more critical of Helms-Burton and has taken measures to 
prevent its full implementation.79 First, the EU convinced the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) 80 dispute settlement panel to examine the 
validity of the Helms-Burton Act under international free trade laws.81 
While not challenging the aim of Helms-Burton to foster democracy 
in communist-ruled Cuba, European officials informed the WTO that 
they objected to the U.S. practice of using U.S. laws against non-U.S. 
firms to impose its will on other countries.82 
In April 1997, the EU suspended its WTO case against Helms-Bur-
ton, but threatened to reinstitute the action if it could not reach an 
agreement with the United States by October 15, 1997.83 Although the 
EU has yet to reinstitute the WTO case, if it were to proceed, the 
76 See Shelley Emling, Embargo of Cuba Has Little Effect; Washington Has Succeeded Only In 
Angering Its Allies In Its Effort To Squeeze The Communist Island, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 17, 
1996, available in LEXIS, Intlaw library, Curnws File. 
77 See id.;jensen, supra note 21, at 56A. 
78 See jensen, supra note 21, at 56A. 
79 See Myers, supra note 21, at A6; Stuteville, supra note 12, at AOI. 
80 See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
38 (1995). "With respect to the governance of the GATT, a World Trade Organization (WTO) 
has been created to oversee an integrated dispute settlement regime and to undertake a pro-active 
trade policy surveillance role. In addition, membership of the WTO now entails commitment to 
most of the GATT codes, which are fully integrated into the GATT /WTO, and no longer operate 
on a conditional MFN basis." See id. 
81 See Stuteville, supra note 12, at AOI. 
82 See Mark Tran, Europe Takes US To Court Over Cuba, GUARDIAN, Nov. 21, 1996, available in 
LEXIS, Intlaw library, Curnws File; jensen, supra note 21, at 56A. 
8S See Cuba: Americas Review 1998, AM. REv. WORLD OF INFO., Mar. 1998, available in LEXIS, 
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United States would in all likelihood prevail, especially if the Clinton 
administration invoked the national security exemption, which allows 
a country to ignore global free trade rules for reasons of national 
security.84 Use of this exemption would permit the United States to 
disregard the pending wro decision.85 The EU believes that use of 
this exemption will set an unhealthy precedent for nations wishing to 
circumvent wro rulings.86 Suspicious of bureaucrats in Geneva mak-
ing unfavorable rulings against its enacted legislation, Congress will 
certainly support the Administration's efforts to bring Helms-Burton 
within the national security exemption.87 
News Library, Questd File; R.W. Apple,Jr., split Over Cuba Is Eased by U.S. and Europeans, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYf File. 
84 See The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 (as amended), art. XXI, 55 
U.N.T.S. 187,266. Article XXI: Security Exceptions of GATT states: 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which 
it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or 
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary 
for the protection of its essential security interests 
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; 
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such 
traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose 
of supplying a military establishment; 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or 
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obliga-
tions under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
Id. At the Third Session (1949) of the Preparatory Committee, it was stated that "every country 
must be the judge in the last resort on questions relating to its own security." GATT, ANALYTICAL 
INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAw AND PRACTICE, 554-56 (6th ed. 1994) [hereinafter GATT INDEX] 
(quoting GATT, CP.3, SR.22, Corr. 1). The question of whether and to what e'ttent the GATT 
signatory nations could review the national security reasons for measures taken under Article 
XXI was discussed in the GATT Council in May and July 1985 in relation to the U.S. trade 
embargo against Nicaragua which had taken effect on May 7, 1985. Id. at 555 & n.9. (quoting 
C/M/188, pp. 2-16; C/M/191, pp. 41-46). The Panel noted that, while both parties to the 
dispute agreed that the United States, by imposing the embargo, had acted contrary to certain 
trade-facilitating provisions of the GATT, they disagreed on the question whether the non-<>bser-
vance of these provisions was justified by Article XXI(b)(iii). The Panel concluded that, as it was 
not authorized to e'l:amine the justification for the United States' invocation of a general e'l:cep-
tion to the obligations under the GATT, it could find the United States neither to be complying 
with its obligations under the GATT nor to be failing to carry out its obligations under that 
Agreement. See id.; Finlay Lewis, Anti-Castro Fervor Leaves Washington Dangerously Isolated, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Nov. 30,1996, at A-31. 
85 See Tran, supra note 82. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. 
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In addition to filing its grievance with the VVTO, the EU has taken 
retaliatory measures.88 Specifically, the EU has adopted retaliatory leg-
islation instructing EU companies to ignore the Helms-Burton Act 
if their interests are threatened by compliance with the law.89 This 
legislation also allows EU companies to bring counterclaims in Euro-
pean courts to recover any financial penalties resulting from lawsuits 
brought under Helms-Burton.9o 
Lastly, consistent with its approval of Helms-Burton's aims, the EU 
passed a resolution urging Cuba to improve its policies on human 
rights and political freedoms.91 This legislative action, however, appears 
to have been motivated more by political and economic interest than 
by bona fide concern for human rights abuses within Cuba.92 For 
instance, while the EU called for "a peaceful transition to a pluralist 
democracy, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms in 
Cuba," it never indicated that trade and investment with Cuba would 
be conditional upon advancements in these areas.93 In essence, with 
the passage of this resolution, the EU provided President Clinton with 
a necessary pretext to suspend the implementation of the Title III 
cause of action provision for six months.94 
BB See Myers, supra note 21, at A6. 
B9 See Stephen Bates & John Palmer, EU Unites In Defiance of us. Curbs, GUARDIAN, Oct. 29, 
1996, at 14. 
90 See id. 
9l See Myers, supra note 21, at A6. The EU resolution warned that its cooperation with Cuba in 
business and trade matters depended on "improvements in human rights and political freedom." 
ld. In addition, the EU called for the release of political prisoners and reforms in Cuba's criminal 
codes. See id. Lastly, the EU indicated that its members would increase their support for opposi-
tion groups within Cuba. See id. 
92 See Meisler, supra note 52, at A6. 
931d. 
94 See Myers, supra note 21, at A6. In pertinent part, Title III, Section 306(b) of the Helms-Bur-
ton Act provides: 
(b) SUSPENSION AUTHORITY. 
(1) SUSPENSION AUTHORITY. The President may suspend the effective date under sub-
section (a) for a period of not more than 6 months if the President determines and 
reports in writing to the appropriate congressional committees at least 15 days before 
such effective date that the suspension is necessary to the national interests ofthe United 
States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. 
(2) ADDITIONAL SUSPENSIONS. The President may suspend the effective date under 
subsection (a) for additional periods of not more than 6 months each, each of which 
shall begin on the day after the last day of the period during which a suspension is in 
effect under this subsection, if the President determines and reports in writing to the 
appropriate congressional committees at least 15 days before the date on which the 
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3. Canada 
One of the Helms-Burton Act's greatest critics has been Canada.95 
For the most part, Canada adamantly opposes Helms-Burton be-
cause of "principle, profits, and the broader issue of American hegem-
ony."96 Like the EU, Canada passed retaliatory legislation in response 
to Helms-Burton.97 The newly-enacted "blocking" orders outlaw judg-
ments handed down under Helms-Burton.98 Under the "blocking or-
ders," Canadians sued under Helms-Burton can file counterclaims in 
Canadian courts to recover damages awarded by U.S. courts.99 
In 1985, Canada passed the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act 
(FEMA) in order to mitigate the effects of the U.S. embargo against 
Cuba.lOO As opposition to U.S. policy toward Cuba has grown, Canada 
may finally implement FEMA, which would undermine the embargo 
by making it illegal for Canadian companies to refuse to trade with 
Cuba. 1OJ FEMA specifically targets Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. com-
panies. l02 
Under FEMA, Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. companies would have 
to inform the Canadian government if their U.S. head offices ordered 
them to decline investment in Cuba. lOS Implementation of the law 
would essentially force subsidiaries to decide between defying their 
parent companies or facing a $10,000 fine or five year prison term 
imposed by the Canadian government.104 Hence, FEMA coerces com-
panies "to defy U.S. foreign policy and punishes them if they do not. "105 
While on the surface FEMA appears to be a strong counter-measure 
to Helms-Burton, it falls far short of really binding Canadian subsidi-
aries of U.S. companies.106 Thus far, subsidiaries have evaded the pen-
additional suspension is to begin that the suspension is necessary to the national 
interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. 
Helms-Burton Act, tit. III, § 306(b), 110 Stat. at 821-22. 
95 See Riggs, supra note 17, at 5F. 
96 See id. 
97 See Myers, supra note 21, at A6; Des Clifford, The Cuban Itch, MINING MAG., Nov. 1996, at 
242. 
98 See Riggs, supra note 17, at 5F. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See Riggs, supra note 17, at 5F. 
104 See id. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
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alties under FEMA by "citing 'other' reasons for non-involvement with 
Cuba."107 In this respect, Canadian subsidiaries are essentially immune 
to FEMA's provisions since the Canadian government has no effective 
means of ascertaining the real motivations behind the business deci-
sions of these companies. lOB 
Moreover, Canada has charged the United States with violating its 
obligations under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) .109 While it is clear that NAFTA created mechanisms that may 
provide critics of Helms-Burton with access to arbitral resolution of 
their claims, including the claim that Title III violates customary inter-
nationallaw,llo the U.S. statement of administrative action accompany-
ing NAFTA explicitly stated that U.S. accession to NAFTA did not 
modifY or alter the U.S. sanctions against Cuba. lll Specifically, Canada 
has charged the United States with violating the liberalized regime for 
business immigration under Chapter 16 of NAFTA. 112 
107 [d. 
108 See Riggs, supra note 17, at 5F. 
109 See Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba, supra note 74, at 432. 
110 See Brice M. Clagett, Agvra: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, 
Continued, 90 AM.]. INT'L L. 641, 642 n.lO (1996) [hereinafter Clagett, Agvra]. 
III See Helms-Burton Act, tit. I, § 110, 110 Stat. at 800. The statement of administrative action 
accompanying that trade agreement specifically states the following: 
[d. 
(1) 'The NAFTA rules of origin will not in any way diminish the Cuban sanctions 
program .... Nothing in the NAFTA would operate to override this prohibition." 
(2) "Article 309(3) [of the NAFTA] permits the United States to ensure that Cuban 
products or goods made from Cuban materials are not imported into the United States 
from Mexico or Canada and that United States products are not exported to Cuba 
through those countries." 
112 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 16, art. 1603, 
32 I.L.M. 296, 664-70 (1992) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
Article 1603: Grant of Temporary Entry 
1. Each Party shall grant temporary entry to business persons who are otherwise 
qualified for entry under applicable measures relating to public health and safety and 
national security, in accordance with this Chapter, including the provisions of Annex 
1603. 
2. A Party may refuse to issue an immigration document authorizing employment to a 
business person where the temporary entry of that person might affect adversely: 
(a) the settlement of any labor dispute that is in progress at the place or intended 
place of employment; or 
(b) the employment of any person who is involved in such dispute. 
3. When a Party refuses pursuant to paragraph 2 to issue an immigration document 
authorizing employment, it shall: 
(a) inform in writing the business person of the reasons for the refusal; and 
(b) promptly notify in writing the Party whose business person has been refused entry 
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In addition to its opposition to Helms-Burton's effect on non-U.S. 
companies, Canada has opposed the Act because of its disagreement 
with the United States' economic strangulation approach.m Instead, 
Canada believes that "nurturing economic, political, and educational 
ties between Cuba and Canada" would better serve the livelihood of 
the Cuban people and the promotion of democracy.1I4 As the world 
has seen in places like Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China, Korea, 
and Taiwan, however, promoting change through engagement can be 
effective, but often requires a great deal of time.ll5 
Despite the imminence of U.S. sanctions, Canada and Cuba have 
enjoyed vast economic interaction. 116 Trade between the two countries 
has expanded so much that Canada is now Cuba's largest trading 
partner. ll7 Canada has provided Cuba with "strong diplomatic ties, 
renewed Canadian foreign aid to assist the island's development, and 
a steady stream of tourists. "118 
Canada and Cuba conducted approximately $500 billion in business 
last year-a sizable increase from $219 million in 1990.ll9 Additionally, 
Canadian tourism to Cuba increased sixteen percent in 1995, with 
more than 140,000 Canadian tourists visiting the island country.120 
Furthermore, a significant number of Canadian companies attended 
the Havana International Trade Fair in November 1996 to explore 
economic opportunities in Cuba.121 
of the reasons for the refusal. 
4. Each Party shall limit any fees for processing applications for temporary entry of 
business persons to the approximate cost of services rendered. 
Id. at 664-65. 
113 SeeJim Boyd, Which Country Is Isolated By Helms-Burton Act?, STAR ThlB., Dec. 2, 1996, at 
llA. 
114Id. 
115 See id. 
116 See Deborah Ramirez, In Canada, U.S. Finds Friendly Foe; Neighbors Ignoring Helms-Burton 
Law, SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 29, 1996, at lA. 
117 See Howard Schneider, Canada and Cuba: Booming Partners; Despite U.S. Obstacles, Trade, 
Diplomacy Flourish, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1996, at AOI. 
118Id. 
119 See Ramirez, supra note 116, at lA. 
120 See id. 
I2I See id. For example, Sherritt International Corp. (Toronto) recently sold "$675 million of 
debentures for capital projects in Cuba, including telecommunications, sugar, and oil refining." 
Id. In addition, Wilton Properties limited, a Canadian real estate group, signed a "$400 million 
joint venture to build 11 hotels in Cuba." Id. 
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4. Mexico 
Like Canada and the EU, Mexico has expressed its opposition to the 
Helms-Burton Act.122 In addition, Mexico has followed in Canada's and 
the EU's footsteps, enacting retaliatory legislation.123 On October 1, 
1996, Mexico's Chamber of Deputies passed a bill retaliating against 
the Helms-Burton legislation; this bill imposes fines of up to $300,000 
on Mexican citizens abiding by extraterritorial laws such as Helms-Bur-
ton.124 Under this legislation, Mexican companies are obligated to 
follow Mexican law first and to inform the Mexican government when 
it is apparent that their activities may subject them to penalties under 
Helms-Burton. 125 
Thus far, the United States has charged only one Mexican company 
with violating the Helms-Burton ACt.126 In 1994, Grupo Domos, a Mexi-
can telecommunications conglomerate, spent $750 million to acquire 
forty-nine percent of Cuba's telephone company.127 The United States 
charges that Grupo Domos is trafficking in property confiscated from 
ITT, the U.S. telecommunications company that ran the telephone 
system before the Cuban revolution.128 If Grupo Domos wishes to abide 
by Helms-Burton, it must withdraw its investment in Cuba.129 Other-
wise, Javier Garza Calderon, Grupo Domos' president, his family, four 
other executives, and their families will lose their U.S. visas.130 
Under Mexican law, however, Grupo Domos faces fines up to 
$300,000 if it obeys Helms-Burton. 131 On the other hand, if Grupo 
Domos ignores Helms-Burton, and ITT prevails in U.S. court, Mexican 
courts may simply ignore any decision rendered against Grupo Domos 
and permit Grupo Domos to bring a counterclaim against ITT in 
Mexican courts for an identical amount of damages. 132 Under its legis-
lation, the Mexican government could place a lien on ITT's Mexican 
122 See Lewis, supra note 84, at A-31; Mary Beth Sheridan, Cuba Wrangle Puts Mexicans in the 
Middle, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1996, at Dl. 
12g See Sheridan, supra note 122, at Dl. 
124 See ill. 
125 See id. 
126 See id. 
127 See id. 
128 See Sheridan, supra note 122, at Dl. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. 
m See id. 
132 See id. 
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properties, such as its Sheraton hotels, if the company refused to pay 
damages pursuant to a Mexican court's judgment.133 
In addition to instituting retaliatory legislation, Mexico has argued 
that the Helms-Burton Act violates U.S. obligations under NAFfA.134 
Mexico, like Canada, has argued that Title IV of Helms-Burton violates 
the liberalized regime for business immigration under Chapter 16 of 
NAFTA.135 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HELMS-BuRTON ACT 
A. Constitutionality of the Helms-Burton Act under the u.s. Constitution 
The Helms-Burton Act, on its face, presents interesting questions of 
constitutionality. Some opponents have charged that the Act violates 
the U.S. Constitution.136 Specifically, opponents have argued that 
Helms-Burton violates equal protection.137 The following section exam-
ines this claim in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of equal 
protection under the Constitution. 
1. The Validity of the Helms-Burton Act under Equal Protection 
The guarantee of equal protection applies to actions by both state138 
and federal139 governments. The Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment applies only to state and local governments.140 
Nothing in the Constitution explicitly requires that the federal govern-
ment provide equal protection of the laws.141 Where the federal gov-
U3 See Sheridan, supra note 122, at D1. 
1M See Lewis, supra note 84, at A-31. 
135 See NAFIA, supra note 112, ch. 16, art. 1603. 
U6See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (UBERTAD) Act of 1995, H.R. Rep. No. 
104-202, pt. 1, at 55 (1995). 
137 See Supporting Democracy in Cuba: Hearings on S.381 and H.R.927 before the Senate Comm. 
on Foreign Relations, lO4th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement oflgnacio E. Sanchez, Att'y, Kelley, 
Drye & Warren), available in 1995 WL 357720 [hereinafter Sanchez Statement]; see also H.R. 
Rep. No. 104-202, pt. 1, at 55. 
ISS U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
139U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
140 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: ''No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
[d. 
141 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 'The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable 
in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth 
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ernment makes a classification which, if it were by a state, would 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the 
Court has treated this as a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause.142 In this respect, the equal protection component of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes the same 
limits on the exercise of federal power that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment places on the exercise of state power.143 
Under equal protection, there are varying degrees of judicial scru-
tiny depending upon the nature of the governmental classification 
involved. 144 The first type of judicial scrutiny under equal protection is 
the "mere rationality" standard.145 The statutes reviewed under this 
lowest-level scrutiny are generally ones which involve economic is-
sues.146 Under the "mere rationality" standard, the Court asks only 
whether it is conceivable that the classification bears a rational rela-
tionship to a government objective which is not prohibited by the 
Constitution.147 At the other end of the spectrum, the Court will use 
"strict scrutiny" in examining any statute which is based upon a "sus-
pect classification" or which impairs a "fundamental right."148 Where 
strict scrutiny is invoked, the classification will be upheld only if it is 
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.149 Lastly, in 
a few situations, the Court has engaged in a scrutiny that is more 
probing than the "mere rationality" standard, but less rigid than the 
"strict scrutiny" standard.150 The Court uses this "middle-level" review 
in cases involving classifications based on gender and illegitimacy. 151 
Where this "middle-level" review is applied, the Court determines 
whether the means chosen by the legislature serve important govern-
mental objectives and are substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives.152 
Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal protection and due 
process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive." ld. 
142 See id. at 500. 
14.!1Sanchez Statement, supra note 137, at 22; see Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500. 
144 See generally GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 601-702 (12th ed. 1991). 
145 See id. at 608. 
146 See id. at 609. 
147ld. 
148 ld. at 636. Classifications based upon race are a classic example of a "suspect" class. See id. 
The right to vote is an example of a fundamental right. See id. 
149 See GUNTHER, supra note 144, at 636. 
150See Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976). 
151 See id.; Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977). 
152 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-98. 
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The Helms-Burton Act can be evaluated under equal protection in 
two ways. First, Helms-Burton implicates equal protection with its crea-
tion of a private cause of action for Cuban nationals who have become 
U.S. citizens.153 Section 302 permits Cuban nationals who have since 
become U.S. citizens to assert a claim under Helms-Burton so long as 
they acquired ownership of the claim to the confiscated property prior 
to enactment of the bill.154 
Exclusion of U.S. nationals of Cuban origin from Helms-Burton 
would create a constitutional infirmity in the bill. 155 Excluding a class 
of U.S. citizens from sharing in the benefits of U.S. law on the basis of 
their national origin violates the equal protection guarantees of the 
U.S. Constitution.156 The guarantee of equal protection of the laws 
demands similar treatment of similarly situated persons.157 While legis-
lative classifications enjoy some presumption of validity, a party may 
rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the classification is de-
void of any conceivable "rational relationship" to a legitimate state 
interest.158 In situations where a classification is based upon charac-
teristics such as race, alienage, or national origin, however, the courts 
have generally recognized that such classifications are rarely relevant 
to the achievement of any legitimate state interest and have struck 
down these classifications as violative of equal protection.159 Conse-
155 See Helms-Burton Act, tit. III, § 302, 110 Stat. at 815-19. 
154 See id. tit. III, § 302(a)(4)(B), 110 Stat. at 816. 
155 Sanchez Statement, supra note 137, at 22; see U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
156 Sanchez Statement, supra note 137, at 22; seeYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, a San Francisco ordinance barred the operation of hand laundries in 
wooden buildings, unless permission was granted by the Board of Supervisors. While issuing 
permits to all but one of the non-Chinese applicants, the Board denied permits to all of the 
approximately 200 Chinese applicants. The Court found that, although the ordinance was neutral 
on its face, there was discrimination in its administration, and this discrimination violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. See id.; see also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477 (1954). In 
Hernandez. v. Texas, the Court treated discrimination against Mexican-Americans with regard to 
jury service in the same manner it treated discrimination against Mrican-Americans and struck 
down the law as a violation of equal protection. See id.; see also City of Richmond v. J A. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). Under current equal protection jurisprudence, discrimination 
against any racial group merits strict scrutiny, even if that group has never been the subject of 
widespread discrimination. See id. In City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., a majority of the Supreme 
Court held that in situations where a city discriminates in favor of black contractors at the expense 
of white contractors, the Court must employ strict scrutiny and the discriminatory act must be 
invalidated. See id. 
157 Sanchez Statement, supra note 137, at 23; see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 
, 158 Sanchez Statement, supra note 137, at 23; see McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 
809 (1969). 
159 Sanchez Statement, supra note 137, at 23; see City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. 
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quently, the courts have presumed classifications based upon race, 
alienage, or national origin to be invalid and have subjected them to 
strict scrutiny.160 In order to overcome strict scrutiny, the suspect clas-
sification created by the legislation must promote a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to achieve this in-
terest.161 
The private cause of action created under Helms-Burton furthers 
the state interests of protecting U.S. citizens' property rights162 and 
discouraging foreign investment in Cuba as a means of weakening 
Castro's totalitarian regime.163 The exclusion of U.S citizens of Cuban 
origin would hinder the achievement of the government's stated inter-
ests. lM Many U.S. citizens of Cuban origin have resided in the United 
States longer than they resided in Cuba, and have been productive, 
law-abiding members of society.165 Preventing U.S. citizens of Cuban 
origin from enjoying the protection afforded by Section 302's cause of 
action serves no legitimate interest.166 Allowing such citizens to benefit 
from Section 302's cause of action, however, advances the foreign 
policy goals of the Helms-Burton Act.167 
Second, the Helms-Burton Act can be evaluated under equal protec-
tion in that it creates a special right to sue in U.S. courts only for those 
who have lost property in Cuba.168 Opponents of Helms-Burton have 
argued that the bill violates equal protection because those who have 
lost property in Cuba are not more deserving than those who have lost 
property in Germany, Eastern Europe, Vietnam, or Russia.169 This ar-
gument, however, does not withstand the applicable constitutional 
analysis. 
160 Sanchez Statement, supra note 137, at 23. see Plyler v. DOE, 457 u.S. 202, 216-17 (1982). 
161 Sanchez Statement, supra note 137, at 23; see Plyler, 457 u.S. at 216-17. 
162Sanchez Statement, supra note 137, at 23; see Helms-Burton Act, § 3, 110 Stat. at 788-89. 
Section 3, which outlines the purposes of the Helms-Burton Act, states that one of the purposes 
of the bill is "(6) to protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings and the wrongful 
trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime." Id. 
16~ Sanchez Statement, supra note 137, at 23; see Helms-Burton Act, § 3, 110 Stat. at 788-89. 
Another stated purpose of the Helms-Burton Act is "(1) to assist the Cuban people in regaining 
their freedom and prosperity, as well as in joining the community of democratic countries that 
are flourishing in the Western Hemisphere." Id. 
164 Sanchez Statement, supra note 137, at 23. 
165Id. 
166Id. 
167 Id. 
168 See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995, H.R. Rep. No. 
104-202, pt. 1, at 55 (1995). 
169 See id. 
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As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court evaluates economic and 
social welfare legislation under the "mere rationality" standard. 170 Title 
Ill's private cause of action provision clearly falls within this class of 
legislation since its stated purpose is to redress U.S. property claims.l71 
The Supreme Court will uphold Helms-Burton if it concludes that 
there is some rational relation between the means selected by Congress 
and a legitimate legislative objective.172 
Although the legislature's "purpose" or "objective" must be "legiti-
mate," the Court has given extreme deference to the legislature's right 
to define its objectives.173 In the case of Helms-Burton, where Congress 
has specifically stated its purposes, it is unlikely that the Court would 
strike down the statute unless it finds the statute to be "grossly unfair" 
or "totally irrational. "174 Nonetheless, the Court will not find every 
objective that motivates a legislature to be "legitimate."175 In Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, the Court invalidated, on equal protection 
grounds, an Alabama statute that taxed out-of-state insurance compa-
nies at a higher rate than in-state companies. 176 The Court held that 
"promotion of domestic business within a State, by discriminating 
against foreign corporations that wish to compete by doing business 
there, [was] not a legitimate state purpose."177 The Helms-Burton Act, 
in contrast, does not promote its purpose of redressing U.S. property 
claims in Cuba by discriminating or engaging in any other "grossly 
unfair" conduct. Hence, the Supreme Court would most likely find that 
the Helms-Burton Act promotes a legitimate governmental interest. 
Although Helms-Burton only addresses the claims of those whose 
property was confiscated by the Cuban government, this does not per 
170 See GUNTHER, supra note 144, at 609. 
I7l See Helms-Burton Act, tit. III, § 302, 110 Stat. at 815-16. 
172 See GUNTHER, supra note 144, at 609. 
173 See U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175, 179 (1980). In U.S. Railroad 
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, a majority of the Court held that lowest-level equal protection review was 
satisfied where there was a "plausible" reason for the classification scheme created by Congress. 
Id. Consistent with past decisions in which the Court "never insisted that a legislative body 
articulate its reasons for enacting a statute," it was "constitutionally irrelevant whether this 
reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision." Id. 
174 See Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949). The fact that the Court 
thinks that the objective behind the legislation is unwise will not be sufficient to make it 
illegitimate. See id. "The forum for the correction of ilkonsidered legislation is a responsive 
legislature." Id.; see Helms-Burton Act, tit. III, § 301, 110 Stat. at 814-15. 
175 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 871 (1985). 
176 See id. 
177 See id. at 880. 
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se constitute a violation of equal protection. 178 The Court rarely invali-
dates an under-inclusive law. 179 A key feature of the "mere rationality" 
standard is that legislation will not be invalidated simply because the 
legislature only contemplated one part of a problem.180 In support of 
this "step-by-step" approach, the Court stated that "it is no requirement 
of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or 
none at all. "181 Thus, while the Helms-Burton Act only addresses prop-
erty confiscations in Cuba, it still conforms with equal protection since 
Congress need not address all u.s. property claims for confiscated 
property abroad in one fell SWOOp.182 Moreover, the Helms-Burton Act 
pursues the legitimate governmental interest of protecting U.S. prop-
erty rights and does so through a rationally related means by creating 
a cause of action against those who are illegally trafficking in U.S. 
property. 183 
17B See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). 
179 See LAURENCE H. TruBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1440 & n.4 (2nd ed. 1988). 
IBO See id. 
IBI See Railway Express Agency, 336 U.S. at 110. At issue in Railway Express Agency was a New 
York City traffic regulation banning the placing of advertising on vehicles. The regulation 
contained an exception, however, permitting the owner of a vehicle to advertise his own products. 
The purpose of the regulation was to reduce traffic hazards. The petitioner challenged the 
exception on the theory that a vehicle carrying advertising for the vehicle's owner was no less 
distracting than a vehicle carrying advertising for others. Nonetheless, the Court found that the 
regulation was not a violation of equal protection. See id. 
IB2 See id. 
ISg See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 470 U.S. at 876-78; Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 
449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981). In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, the Court had to decide the 
constitutionality of a Minnesota statute that banned the retail sale of milk in plastic non-return-
able, non-refillable containers, but allowed the sale of such in other non-returnable, non-refillable 
containers, such as paperboard cartons. Id. at 458-59. The Court held that "the Equal Protection 
Clause does not deny the State of Minnesota the authority to ban one type of milk container 
conceded to cause environmental problems, merely because another type, already established in 
the market, is permitted to continue in use. Id. at 466. 'Whether in fact the Act will promote 
more environmentally desirable milk packaging is not the question: the Equal Protection Clause 
is satisfied by our conclusion that the Minnesota Legislature could rationally have decided that 
its ban on plastic non-returnable milk jugs might foster greater use of environmentally desirable 
alternatives." Id. Hence, Clover Leaf Creamery stands for the proposition that it is irrelevant 
whether or not a statute will in fact achieve any of its objectives. See id. Rather, the Court must 
only address the question of whether the legislature "could rationally have decided" that it would 
meet these objectives. See id. 
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B. Validity of the Helms-Burton Act under International Law and the 
Act of State Doctrine 
As mentioned earlier, several governments, such as Canada, Mexico, 
and members of the EU, have argued that the Helms-Burton Act is an 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in violation of customary inter-
national law.184 In espousing this claim, these countries overlook the 
fact that their corporate citizens are the principal traffickers in prop-
erty that rightfully belongs to U.S. citizens and corporations. ISS Unfor-
tunately for these countries, however, Helms-Burton is supported by 
more than just policy arguments and rests firmly upon widely accepted 
principles of international law. 186 
1. International Law and the Effects Doctrine 
The concept of "objective territoriality" in international law is ap-
plied to offenses or acts commenced outside the state's territory, but 
completed within the state's territory or causing serious and harmful 
consequences to the social and economic order within the state's 
territory. 187 Applying this basic international law principle, U.S. federal 
courts and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law interpret 
the objective territoriality principle broadly.188 Under the "effects doc-
trine," a state may exercise jurisdiction on the basis of reprehensible 
184 See Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent With International Law, 
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 434, 434 (1996) [hereinafter Clagett, Title III]. 
185Id. 
186 See id. at 434, 440; Ratchik, supra note 11, at 364. 
187 See The S.S. "Lotus" (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.lJ., (ser. A), No. 10 (Negligence occurring 
on board a French ship (considered French territory) had the effect of causing injury on a 
Turkish ship (considered Turkish territory»; see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 
148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945). 
188REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 402 (1987). Section 402 of the 
Restatement, Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, states: 
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to: 
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory; 
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory; 
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within 
its territory; 
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within 
its territory; 
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed 
against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests. 
Id. The effects doctrine has been applied in various types of cases, including anti-trust, securities 
trading, export controls, and environmental protection, with U.S. courts holding that conduct 
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effects or consequences within the territory of acts committed outside 
of the territory.189 It is important to note, however, that even when one 
of the bases for jurisdiction under Section 402 of the Restatement 
exists, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect 
to a person or activity having connections with another state when the 
exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.190 Hence, under interna-
tional law, a state may prescribe rules of law with respect to conduct 
outside its territory that has or is intended to have a substantial effect 
within its territory as long as, in light of the surrounding circum-
stances, the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. 191 Today, the prevail-
ing international view is that foreign economic activity is reasonable 
and thus within a state's prescriptive jurisdiction if it produces discern-
ibly significant economic damage to the state's interest.192 
between foreign companies on foreign soil could nevertheless subject them to U.S. jurisdiction 
if there are effects in the United States. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l 
Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 444. 
189 See Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 444. 
190 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 403. Section 403, Limitations on 
Jurisdiction to Prescribe, states: 
ld. 
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may not 
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connec-
tions with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable. 
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is deter-
mined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate: 
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, Le., the extent to 
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foresee-
able effect upon or in the territory; 
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity between the 
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, 
or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect; 
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the 
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree 
to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted; 
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the 
regulation; 
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic 
system; 
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the interna-
tional system; 
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; 
and 
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. 
191 RESTATE:.fENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw §§ 402(1) (c), 403. 
192 See id., reporter's note 2. 
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Relying on the "substantial effect" provision of this doctrine, Con-
gress has passed numerous laws, most notably the anti-trust laws.193 
Congress apparently justified passage of the Helms-Burton Act on the 
substantial effect that Cuba's uncompensated confiscations had on 
u.s. nationals. According to the Foreign Claims Settlement Commis-
sion, U.S. nationals possess claims to confiscated property exceeding 
$6 billion.194 Since Castro purposefully has been selling this property 
to foreign investors in order to block the rightful u.S. property owners 
from receiving compensation, the settlement of these property claims 
through the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission will be compli-
cated and protracted.195 The sizable property claims coupled with this 
obstacle to obtaining just compensation arguably prejudices the rights 
and interests of U.S. nationals and has a substantial effect on the 
United States.196 
Nonetheless, under the Restatement's provisions, international law 
requires a state that justifies its legislation with the "substantial effects" 
principle to refrain from applying this legislation when another state's 
legitimate and reasonable interests outweigh its own interests.197 In 
evaluating Helms-Burton's compliance with international law, it is nec-
essary to ascertain whether any other state has an interest greater than 
that of the United States.19B The Restatement, Section 403, provides a 
useful list of factors which can be employed in conducting this evalu-
ation. 199 
With respect to Cuba, it is abundantly clear that Cuba has no legiti-
mate interest in confiscating property, denying compensation, and 
profiting from foreign investment in that property.200 These actions, 
which constitute comprehensive violations of international law, fully 
justifY U.S. countermeasures, such as Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, 
"even if those measures would otherwise be unlawful. "201 Hence, with 
regard to Cuba, Helms-Burton survives any attack challenging its valid-
ity under international law. 202 
193 See Clagett. Title III, supra note 184. at 436. 
194 See id. at 435. 
195 See id. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. at 436; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 403. 
198 See Clagett. Title III, supra note 184. at 436; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAw § 403. 
199 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 403(2). 
200 Clagett. Title III, supra note 184. at 436. 
2011d. at 436 & noll; See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 905. 
202 See Clagett. Title III, supra note 184. at 436. 
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Other states, such as Canada, Mexico, and the EU, have an interest 
in protecting the ability of their nationals to traffic in confiscated 
property.203 It is necessary, then, to balance the competing interests of 
these states with U.S. interests to determine if extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion under Helms-Burton is reasonable by standards that can be shared 
by the international community.204 It is important to note that the list 
of factors in Section 403 is not exhaustive and that the weight to be 
given any particular factor or group of factors depends on the circum-
stances.205 
Under Section 403, one factor that is particularly relevant to evalu-
ating Helms-Burton's extraterritorial jurisdiction is "the link of the 
activity to the territory of the regulating state (i.e., the extent to which 
the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, 
and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory)."206The claims of U.S. 
nationals, as certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 
including interest, now total more than $6 billion.207 Since just mone-
tary compensation to all claimants was far beyond Cuba's resources, 
Castro implemented the strategy of involving foreign companies in 
confiscated properties in order to place significant roadblocks in the 
path of claims resolu~ion.208 The clouds on titles created by these 
purported valid transfers to traffickers of other nationalities would, at 
the very least, delay and complicate the task of settling the valid 
property claims of U.S. nationals through the Foreign Claims Settle-
ment Commission.209 To the extent that the rights and interests of U.S. 
victims are prejudiced, these invalid title transfers have a substantial 
effect on the United States.210 It is arguable that the interest of other 
nations is, at most, no greater than the U.S. interest in protecting the 
ability of U.S. nationals, the rightful owners, to prevent further inter-
203 See id. 
204 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 403; ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, 
I:-ITEIUIATIONAL LITIGATION A:-ID THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS 20 (1996); see also Hartford 
Fire Insurance, Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818 (1993). "In sum, the practice of using 
international law to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly established in our juris-
prudence." Id. 
205 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 403 cmt. b. 
206 See id. § 403(2)(a). 
207 See Clagett, Title III, supra note 184, at 435. 
208Id. 
209 See id. 
2\0 Id. 
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ference with their property and perhaps ultimately to recover the 
property or obtain monetary compensation.21l 
Similarly, the United States' interest is arguably more legitimate than 
any other state's interest in allowing its nationals to continue reaping 
profits from illegally-seized property in a foreign nation.212 It is widely 
recognized that Castro's confiscations were made without compensa-
tion and involved discrimination against U.S. nationals and Cuban 
opponents of the Castro regime.213 Traffickers arguably are aware that 
they are dealing in tainted property and have assumed the risk that 
the dispossessed owners or aggrieved states might take action against 
them.214 It is widely accepted that confiscations in violation of interna-
tionallaware ineffective in passing valid title to property and that states 
are not required to recognize title obtained in this manner.215 Thus, 
while both the interests of the United States and challenging states are 
equally "extraterritorial," the United States should prevail since its 
interests outweigh those of its challengers with respect to the confis-
cated property in Cuba.216 Moreover, if U.S. trading partners are aiding 
and abetting trafficking by their nationals, they are subject to U.S. 
coun termeasures. 217 
Another relevant factor under Section 403 is "the importance of the 
regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system."218 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting termination 
of Soviet aid, Cuba has encountered severe economic problems, with 
its average citizens bearing the brunt of the hardship.219 The United 
States, as well as the rest of the world, has a strong interest in "facili-
tating the rapid economic development of post-Castro Cuba without 
the rancor, litigation, and clouds on title that Castro's foreign-invest-
ment strategy [of entangling foreign investors] will inevitably cause 
when he is gone."220 Furthermore, Cuba's geographical proximity, its 
history of hostile relations with the United States, its persistence in 
suppressing democracy, violating human rights, and refusing to satisfy 
211 See itl. at 436. 
212 See Clagett, Title Ill, supra note 184, at 436. 
213Id. at 437. 
214Id. 
215Id. at 438. 
216Id. at 437. 
217 Clagett, Agora, supra note 110, at 64l. 
218 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 403(2)(e). 
219 Clagett, Title Ill, supra note 184, at 435. 
220 Id. 
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international law claims against it arguably have a substantial impact 
on the United States.221 Since the United States has a legitimate interest 
in eradicating these problems and Congress has concluded that "dis-
couraging foreign investment in tainted Cuban property is an appro-
priate and proportionate means" for accomplishing this task, Helms-
Burton arguably should be accorded great weight in the balancing of 
interests under Section 403.222 
Lastly, under Section 403 (d), the "existence of justified expectations 
that might be protected or hurt by the regulation" should be taken 
into account when weighing the competing interests of states.223 As 
mentioned above, claims of U.S. nationals alone exceed $6 billion.224 
Castro has embarked on the systematic plan of using foreign investors 
to erect barriers to U.S. recovery or compensation for the confiscated 
property. 225 Although other nations have an interest in protecting their 
nationals from being hurt by lawsuits filed under Helms-Burton, their 
interest is weakened by the fact that the U.S. Department of State has 
repeatedly warned these nations of the repercussions of dealing in 
confiscated property.226 In a message entitled "Buyer Beware: Cuba May 
Be Selling American Property," Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
instructed State Department officials to put their host governments on 
notice by stating: 
We hope that the government of Cuba will ultimately decide 
to return expropriated properties to their original owners. If 
the properties are purchased by foreign investors before this 
occurs, restitution will prove far more difficult . . . . Care 
should be taken by prospective investors to ensure that prop-
erty the Cuban government attempts to sell or otherwise 
dispose of is not the subject of a claim by a U.S. nationaP27 
221Id. at 435-36. For example, the United States has a legitimate interest in stemming the tide 
of refugees seeking asylum from communist Cuba. Id. 
222Id. at 436; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 403(e). 
223 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIOSS LAw § 403(d). 
224 See Clagett, Title III, supra note 184, at 435. 
225 See id. 
226 See id. 
227Id. at 435 (quoting Secretary Warren Christopher, Circular to all diplomatic and consular 
posts, Sept. 1993, reprinted in Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
104th Cong., 1st Sess. 192-93 (1995)). 
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In light of these facts, the United States arguably has a stronger interest 
in protecting and fostering the ability of its nationals to recover or 
receive compensation for their confiscated property than do other 
nations in protecting their nationals from lawsuits.228 
In summary, the United States may exercise jurisdiction under the 
"effects doctrine" in seeking restitution from foreign nationals cur-
rently trafficking in confiscated U.S. property.229 Pursuant to Section 
402 of the Restatement, the United States has jurisdiction to prescribe 
law with respect to foreign trafficking in confiscated U.S. property 
because this conduct has and was intended to have a substantial effect 
within the United States.230 In addition, U.S. jurisdiction with respect 
to this matter is reasonable in light of the most relevant factors under 
Section 403 of the Restatement.231 
2. The Act of State Doctrine 
Historically, the "act of state doctrine," a domestic court-made con-
cept, precluded U.S. federal courts from questioning the validity of the 
acts of foreign nations. 232 Created in order to avoid the adjudication of 
delicate international political issues, the doctrine calls for judicial 
deference to public acts of a foreign state conducted within that state's 
territory.233 In essence, the act of state doctrine functions like a choice-
of-law rule by which courts defer to a foreign state's prescriptive author-
ity within its own territory.234 
Although the act of state doctrine apparently precludes federal dis-
trict courts from hearing property claims of U.S. citizens brought 
under Title III, Congress possesses the discretionary power to enjoin 
courts from invoking the doctrine. 235 With the enactment of the Sec-
ond Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
228 See id. 
229 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw §§ 402-03. 
230 See id. § 402(1) (c); Clagett, Title III, supra note 184, at 435-36. 
m See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 403. 
232 See Ratchik, supra note 11, at 365; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 
421-23 (1964). In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court indicated unequivocally that the act of state 
doctrine is required neither by international law nor by the Constitution. See id. 
233 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416-18. 
234 See id. 
235 See Ratchik, supra note 11, at 366 & n. 132 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 
166, 182 (2d Cir. 1967) (acknowledging Congress's decision to enjoin courts from applying the 
act of state doctrine as a permissible exercise of its power pursuant to the Commerce and the 
Necessary and Proper Clauses of the U.S. Constitution). 
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Congress stated that courts were required to adjudicate claims to prop-
erty taken in violation of internationallaw.236 
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act appropriately includes a provision 
that precludes application of the act of state doctrine to any lawsuit 
brought under its authority.237 This preclusion is appropriate since the 
Supreme Court indicated unequivocally in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino that the act of state doctrine is required neither by interna-
tionallaw nor by the Constitution.238 Thus, in the absence of a presi-
dential order instructing federal courts to apply the act of state doc-
trine, U.S. nationals may pursue their property claims against the 
Cuban government. 239 
In summary, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act not only complies 
with international law, but also fosters the development of common 
sense enforcement mechanisms in the troublesome area of expropria-
tion where "rogue states" often trample on the human rights of their 
own citizens and foreign nationals with "impunity."240 Title Ill's crea-
tion of a cause of action represents a firm stand against the trafficking 
in stolen property that has provided Castro with the necessary funds 
to perpetuate his rule and constitutes a crucial step toward redressing 
and protecting the property rights of U.S. nationals abroad. 241 Thus, 
Cuba and other nations who tolerate and encourage the trafficking in 
confiscated property by their nationals have little, if any, legal basis 
under international law upon which to mount an effective attack on 
the Helms-Burton Act. 242 
C. The Helms-Burton Act and U.S. Obligations under International 
Agreements 
Opponents of the Helms-Burton Act contend that the bill forces the 
United States to violate its obligations under international agreements 
such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) .243 It is arguable, 
however, that Helms-Burton is consistent with both of these agree-
236 See id. at 366. 
237 See Helms-Burton Act, tit. III, § 302(a)(6), 110 Stat. at 817. 
238 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421-23; Clagett, Title III, supra note 184, at 440. 
239 Ratchik, supra note 11, at 366. 
240 Clagett, Title IlL supra note 184, at 440. 
241 See id. 
242 See id. 
243 See Ratchik, supra note 11, at 351-57; Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba, supra note 74, at 432. 
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ments.244 The following sections demonstrate the manner in which 
Helms-Burton complies with both the GATT and NAFfA. 
1. The Helms-Burton Act's Compliance with the GATT 
In essence, the GATT is the heart of the multilateral world trading 
regime.245 In its preamble, the GATT commits its contracting parties 
(Contracting Parties), including Cuba, to enter into "reciprocal and 
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduc-
tion of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international commerce. "246 Nations op-
posing the implementation of Helms-Burton will most likely bring their 
claims under Articles I and XI of GATT.247 Article I, the basic non-dis-
crimination clause in GATT, requires Contracting Parties to treat "like 
products" with equal preference.248 In strengthening the economic 
embargo against Cuba, Title I, Section 110 of Helms-Burton treats 
products purchased from Cuba differently than products purchased 
from other nations.249 For example, by prohibiting the importation and 
dealings in any sugar product that originates in Cuba, was located or 
244 See GATT art. XX; NAITA, supra note 112, ch. 16, art. 1603 & annex 1603, 32 I.L.M. 296. 
2451REBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 80, at 25. 
246 GATT pmbl. 
247 See GATT arts. I, XI; Ratchik, supra note 11, at 351-57. 
248 Ratchik, supra note 11, at 353; see GATT art. I. 
249 See Helms-Burton Act, tit. I, § 110, 110 Stat. at 800. 
Id. 
SEC. 110. IMPORTATION SAFEGUARD AGAINST CERTAIN CUBAN PRODUCTS. 
(a) PROHIBITION ON IMPORT OF AND DEALINGS IN CUBAN PRODUCTS. The Congress notes 
that section 515.204 of Title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, prohibits the entry of, 
and dealings outside the United States in, merchandise that: 
(1) is of Cuban origin; 
(2) is or has been located in or transported from or through Cuba; or 
(3) is made or derived in whole or in part of any article which is the growth, produce, 
or manufacture of Cuba. 
(b) .... 
(c) RESTRICTION OF SUGAR IMPORTS. The Congress notes that section 902(c) of the Food 
Security Act of 1985 (Public Law 99--198) requires the President not to allocate any of 
the sugar import quota to a country that is a net importer of sugar unless appropriate 
officials of that country verifY to the President that the country does not import for 
reexport to the United States any sugar produced in Cuba. 
(d) AsSURANCES REGARDING SUGAR PRODUCTS. Protection of essential security interests 
of the United States requires assurances that sugar products that are entered, or with-
drawn from warehouse for consumption, into the customs territory of the United States 
are not products of Cuba. 
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transported through Cuba, or was derived in whole or in part from 
Cuban sugar, Helms-Burton clearly raises the possibility of a U.S. vio-
lation of the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) obligations under GATT.250 
Typically, the origin of products determines whether the United 
States must afford MFN treatment to the sugar products of countries 
that purchase Cuban sugar.251 Essentially, there are two methods of 
determining the origin of a product: the "substantial transformation" 
method and the "value-added" method.252 Under the substantial trans-
formation method, a product is considered to originate in the "most 
recent exporting country only if within that country there has been a 
'substantial transformation' of the input goods obtained from another 
country."253 There is no consensus, however, as to what constitutes a 
substantial transformation.254 In the value-added method, the origin of 
a product is considered to be "the last country of export if that country 
has added a certain percentage of value" to the good.255 
Under Section llO of Helms-Burton, however, the origin of sugar 
products is disregarded.256 Section llO does not take into account the 
origin of the product being exported to the United States, but rather 
prohibits the importation of sugar products from any country that 
purchases sugar from Cuba.257 While opponents of Helms-Burton ar-
gue that this prohibition is a violation of GATT, they fail to take note 
of Article XX, which brings this U.S. prohibition within the GATT's 
framework. 258 Under Article XX of the GATT, Contracting Parties are 
permitted to avoid their obligations under the agreement by invoking 
numerous exceptions.259 One of the most relevant exceptions for pur-
poses of justifYing Helms-Burton under GATT is that which allows 
Contracting Parties to implement measures necessary to protect public 
25°Ratchik, supra note 11, at 353; see GATT art. I. 
251 Ratchik, supra note II, at 354; see GATT art. I (affording MFN treatment to like products 
"originating in ... the territories of all other contracting parties."). 
252 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAw AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 143 (1989) [hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM]; Ratchik, supra 
note 11, at 354. 
253 [d. 
254Ratchik, supra note 11, at 354 n.70; see JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF 
GATT 467 (1969) [hereinafter JACKSON, LAw OF GATT]. 
255 See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 252, at 143; Ratchik, supra note II, at 354 
n.7l. 
256 See Helms-Burton Act, tit. I, § 110, 110 Stat. at 800; Ratchik, supra note 11, at 354. 
257 Ratchik, supra note 11, at 354; see Helms-Burton Act, tit. I, § 110, 110 Stat. at 800. 
258 Ratchik, supra note II, at 355; see GATT art. XX. 
259 See Ratchik, supra note 11, at 355; GATT art. XX. 
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morals and to condemn products of prison labor.260 In refusing to 
accept sugar products from countries that import Cuban sugar, the 
United States not only expresses its disapproval with the continued 
violation of human and worker rights in Cuba, but also indirectly 
alleviates these abuses by contributing to the economic troubles facing 
the Castro regime.261 In light of these exceptions and the U.S. rationale 
for its prohibitions, Section 110 of Helms-Burton does not violate the 
GATT. 262 
Opponents of Helms-Burton also argue that Title I's prohibition of 
indirect importation of Cuban sugar, syrups, or molasses into the 
United States represents a violation of the GATT Article Xl's prohibi-
tion of the use of "other measures" to restrict the import or export of 
any product.263 Again, Article XX's public morals exception is applica-
260 See Ratchik, supra nore 11, at 355; GATT art. XX, paras. (a), (e). Article XX states: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing 
in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: 
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(c) .... 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not consistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, 
the enforcement of monopolies operared under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article 
XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of 
deceptive practices; 
(e) relating to the products of prison labor. 
Id. According to OUo J. Reich, President of the U.S.-Cuba Business Council, the Cuban govern-
ment's well-documented record of human rights abuses that directly impact trade and investment 
activity include violations of International Labor Organization conventions on the use of forced 
labor, the denial of freedom of association and the right to organize, and employment discrimi-
nation. In addition, Cuban workers have no voice in their working conditions, are allocated by 
the government as any other piece of equipment, and are jailed up to eight years just for trying 
to organize a labor union. See Supporting Democracy in Cuba, 1995: Hearings on S.381 Before the 
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of OUo J. Reich, 
President of U.S.-Cuba Business Council), available in 1995 WI.. 364642. 
261 See Ratchik, supra note 11, at 355. 
262 See GATT art. XX; Helms-Burton Act, tit. I, § 110, 110 Stat. at 800. 
263 See GATT art. XI; Ratchik, supra note 11, at 351-52. Specifically, Article XI states: 
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted 
or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the 
territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any 
product destined for the rerritory of any other contracting party. 
GATT art. XI. 
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ble, allowing the United States to prohibit the indirect importation of 
Cuban sugar products into the United States.264 Furthermore, Article 
XX of GATT permits Contracting Parties to adopt measures in order 
to accommodate other laws and regulations promulgated by the legis-
latures of those Contracting Parties. 265 
Under this exception, however, the measure adopted to accommo-
date other laws or regulations must be necessary to ensure compliance 
with these laws or regulations266 and must not be inconsistent with 
other GATT provisions.267 Helms-Burton does not violate GATT since 
the United States can justifY the Act's "importation ban on sugar, 
syrups, and molasses from countries that import such products from 
Cuba as a necessary means of securing compliance with the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961," which prohibits any U.S. assistance to Cuba, 
including: 
any quota authorizing the importation of Cuban sugar into 
the United States or to receive any other benefit under any 
law of the United States, until the President determines that 
[Cuba] has taken appropriate steps ... to return to United 
States citizens, and to U.S. [corporations] ... or to provide 
equitable compensation to such citizens and entities for prop-
264 See GATT art. XX, para. (a). 
265 Ratchik, supra note 11, at 356; see GATT art. XX, para. (d). GATT, art. XX, para. (d) states: 
[d. 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing 
in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, 
the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article 
XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of 
deceptive practices. 
266Ratchik, supra note 11, at 356; see GATT INDEX, supra note 84, at 533-34 (quoting United 
States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages: Report of the Panel, GATT Doc. DS23, 
paras. 5.40-5.43 (June 19, 1992) (examining U.S. regulation requiring beer importers to distrib-
ute their products through in-state wholesalers). The United States argued that the regulation 
was "necessary to ensure compliance" with state excise tax laws. The Panel concluded that the 
regulation was not necessary for purposes of Article XX(d) because the United States possessed 
and could have utilized alternative measures that were not inconsistent with GATT. [d. 
267 Ratchik, supra note 11, at 356; see GATT art. XX, para. (d). 
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erty taken from such citizens and entities on or after January 
1, 1959, by the Government of Cuba.268 
Since Cuba has failed to return confiscated property or provide com-
pensation to any U.S. nationals, Helms-Burton qualifies under Article 
XX's "other measures" exception because its importation ban is nec-
essary to carry out the ban on U.S. assistance to Cuba.269 While oppo-
nents of Helms-Burton raise valid objections under GAIT, the Act 
arguably fits within the exceptions contained in that agreement.270 
2. The Helnis-Burton Act's Compliance with the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
On January 1, 1994, the United States, Canada, and Mexico entered 
NAFTA, establishing a single trade zone comprising nearly 360 million 
people. 271 Although NAFTA does not create a full-fledged common 
market, it does create a free trade zone in goods and significantly 
liberalizes the treatment of investment, intellectual property, and serv-
ices across the continent.272 In this respect, NAFTA creates opportuni-
269 Ratchik, supra note 11, at 357 & n.85; see Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2370(a)(2) (1988). 
269 See Foreign Assistance Act ofl961 , 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(2) (1988); GATT art. XX, para. (d). 
270 See GATT art. XX. 
271 See NAFTA, supra note 112, 32 I.L.M. at 297; BARRY APPLETON, NAVIGATING NAFTA 1 
(1994). 
272APPLETON, supra note 271, at 1. As stated in Article 1020fNAFTA: 
1. The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically through its princi-
ples and rules, including national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment and trans-
parency, are to: 
(a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods 
and services between the territories of the Parties; 
(b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area; 
(c) increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties; 
(d) provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights in each Party's territory; 
(e) create effective procedures for the implementation and application of this Agree-
ment, for its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes; and 
(f) establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation 
to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement. 
2. The Parties shall interpret and apply the provisions of this Agreement in the light of 
its objectives set out in paragraph 1 and in accordance with applicable rules of interna-
tionallaw. 
NAFTA, supra note 112, ch. 1, art. 102, 32 I.L.M. at 297. 
1998] THE HELMS-BURTON ACT 533 
ties and challenges to nearly every business operating within the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico.273 
Opponents of Helms-Burton have argued that the Act violates U.S. 
obligations under NAFfA.274 Specifically, Canada and Mexico have 
argued that Title IV's immigration provisions violate the liberalized 
regime for business immigration under Chapter 16 of NAFfA. 275 Arti-
cle 1603(1) of NAFfA states: 
Each party shall grant temporary entry to business persons 
who are otherwise qualified for entry under applicable meas-
ures relating to public health and safety and national security, 
in accordance with this Chapter, including the provisions of 
Annex 1603.276 
In order to avoid violating U.S. obligations under NAFfA, the United 
States must justifY its exclusion of Canadian or Mexican business peo-
ple under Title IV of Helms-Burton by demonstrating that these busi-
ness people are not "otherwise qualified."277 Pursuant to NAFfA, An-
nex 1603, each party must grant temporary entry to a business person 
seeking to engage in a business activity provided that the business 
person otherwise complies with "existing immigration measures. "278 
For the United States, "existing immigration measures" is defined as 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952.27.9 
For the most part, Canadian or Mexican business people who fall 
within the Title IV exclusion category do not present risks to public 
health.28o Under the INA, such risks include communicable diseases of 
public health significance,281 physical or mental disorders,282 and drug 
addictions.283 It is also unlikely that such business people would pose a 
273 See PAUL, HASTINGS, jANOFSKY & WALKER, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: 
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 1 (1993). 
274 See Mark AA. Warner, Cutting Ourselves on Cuban Policy, FOREIGN AsSETS LITIG. REp., Apr. 
1996, at 13; Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995, H.R. Rep. No. 
104-202, pt. I, at 53 (1995). 
275 See NAFTA, supra note 112, ch. 16, art. 1603, 32 I.L.M. at 664-65; Warner, supra note 274, 
at 13. 
276NAFTA, supra note 112, ch. 16, art. 1603, 32 I.L.M. at 664-65. 
277 See id. 
278 See id. ch. 16, annex 1603. 
279 [d. ch. 16, app. 1603A.3., 32 I.L.M. at 668. 
280 See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 212(a)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l) (1952) [hereinafter 
INA]. 
281 See id. § 2I2(a)(I)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(I)(A)(i). 
282 See id. § 2I2(a)(I)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(I)(A)(ii). 
283 See id. § 2I2(a)(I)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(I)(A)(iii). 
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threat to public safe ty. 284 Under INA, an alien would constitute a public 
safety risk if he was convicted of a crime of moral turpitude, such as 
murder, rape, arson, blackmail, fraud, or counterfeiting.285 
By implementing Helms-Burton, the United States can avoid violat-
ing NAFTA only if the exclusion of Canadian or Mexican nationals 
under Title IV can be justified on national security grounds.286 At best, 
the United States can only show that Canadian or Mexican nationals 
represent an indirect threat to national security. Under INA, the 
United States may prohibit foreign nationals from entering the coun-
try for national security grounds, such as espionage, sabotage or illegal 
activity,287 terrorism,288 or other foreign policy grounds. 289 It is improb-
able that Canadian or Mexican business people excludable under Title 
IV, Section 401(a)(1), (2), or (3) would present such national security 
threats.29o It is also improbable that spouses, minor children, or agents 
of persons excludable under sub-paragraphs (1), (2), or (3) would 
pose such serious threats to the United States.291 
Under INA's exclusion for "other foreign policy grounds," however, 
an alien is excludable if the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds 
to believe that his entry or proposed activity in the United States 
"would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences 
for the U.S. "292 The United States could use this exclusionary provision 
to make a strained argument that Helms-Burton does not violate 
NAFTA. If the United States were to permit Canadian and Mexican 
business people to ignore Helms-Burton's restrictions pertaining to 
business entry, while strictly applying it to business people from other 
countries, the governments of these other countries would vehemently 
protest this inequitable treatment of their nationals. These govern-
ments would also implement retaliatory measures aimed at hurting the 
interests of U.S. businesses abroad and would take other actions seri-
ously adverse to U.S. foreign policy interests. For this reason, the 
284 See id. § 212(a)(2) (A) (i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
285 See INA, § 212(a)(2)(A) (i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
286 See NAFTA, supra note 112, ch. 16, art. 1603(1), 32 I.L.M. at 664. 
287 See INA, §212(a) (3) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3) (A). 
288 See id. §212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B). 
289 See id. § 212(a)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (C). 
290 See Helms-Burton Act, tit. IV, § 401 (a)(I-3), 110 Stat. at 822. 
291 See id. tit. IV, § 401(a)(4), 110 Stat. at 822. 
292 See INA, § 212(a)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3)(C). Section 212(a)(3)(C) states: "An alien 
is excludable if the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe that his entry or proposed 
activity in the U.S. would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the 
United States." Id. 
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United States can exclude Canadian and Mexican business people who 
fall under Title IV of Helms-Burton while adhering to NAFTA.293 This 
exclusion based on foreign policy grounds is arguably permissible 
under NAFTA, Article 1603, which allows parties to deny temporary 
entry to business people if such people are not otherwise qualified for 
entry.294 If allowing entry to Canadian and Mexican business people 
would create serious adverse foreign policy problems with other coun-
tries, these business people would be unqualified for entry.295 
Rather than making such strained arguments, the United States 
could take one of two possible actions to address the Act's apparent 
violation of U.S. obligations under NAFTA: either repeal Title IV's 
exclusion provision or amend the INA to include theft or conversion 
of stolen property abroad among its national security exclusions. Con-
gress should avoid repealing Title IV since this would signal a retreat 
from the resolve and purpose behind Helms-Burton.296 It would be 
more consistent with U.S. policy to add a "theft or conversion of 
stolen property" national security exclusion to INA. In this manner, the 
United States could bring the class of business people sought to be ex-
cluded by Title IV within the permissible exclusion of Article 1603(1) 
ofNAFTA.297 
CONCLUSION 
Since 1960, U.S. nationals, including Cubans who have since become 
U.S. citizens, have possessed valid property claims against the Cuban 
government. The U.S. government, however, never directly addressed 
the Cuban government's uncompensated expropriation of U.S. prop-
erty within Cuba. With the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, the 
United States has created the means for taking direct action to redress 
the extensive property claims of its citizens. While opponents of the 
293 See Helms-Burton Act, tit. IV, § 401, 110 Stat. at 822-24. 
294 See NAFfA, supra note 112, art. 1603(1), 321.L.M. at 664. 
295 See id.; INA, § 212(a)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C). 
296 See Helms-Burton Act, § 3, 110 Stat. at 788-89. 
297 See id. tit; IV, 110 Stat. at 822-24; NAFfA, supra note 112, art. 1603(1), 32 I.L.M. at 664. 
While self-executing and legislatively executed treaties prevail over state law, they do not neces-
sarily prevail over federal statutory law. Treaty law and federal statutory law are virtually equivalent 
in status. When both address the same issue, courts attempt to interpret the terms of each in 
such a manner as to avoid outright conflict. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. 
Supp. 1456, 1464, 1468 (S.D.N.Y 1988). When the reconciliation is not possible, the general rule 
is that the last in time prevails. SeeWhitneyv. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). Hence, a later 
treaty may supersede an earlier federal law. Likewise, legislative action may supersede an earlier 
treaty. See id. 
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bill have levied a wide array of challenges against the Act, Helms-Bur-
ton arguably overcomes all of these challenges. 
Under the U.s. Constitution, Helms-Burton withstands equal protec-
tion challenges since it does not exclude any class of U.S. citizens from 
invoking its provisions. While the Act only addresses property confis-
cations in Cuba, it still comports with equal protection since Congress 
need not address all U.S. property claims for confiscated property at 
once. Thus, Helms-Burton is constitutional. 
The Helms-Burton act also complies with international law. First, 
Helms-Burton is consistent with the concept of "objective territoriality" 
since Cuba's confiscation of U.S. property had a "substantial effect" 
within the United States and exercise of jurisdiction by the United 
States over the claims to this property is reasonable under international 
standards. Second, the "act of state" doctrine does not apply to the 
Helms-Burton Act since the Act explicitly precludes application of the 
doctrine and because the Supreme Court has indicated that the "act 
of state" doctrine is neither required by international law nor by the 
Constitution. 
Lastly, the Helms-Burton Act is consistent with U.S. obligations un-
der both GATT and NAFTA. Although Helms-Burton strengthens the 
economic embargo against Cuba by prohibiting the importation or 
dealings in any Cuban sugar product, GATT Article XX's exceptions 
permit the United States to implement this strengthened embargo 
without violating GATT. Article XX permits its members to avoid obli-
gations under GATT if that member's actions are necessary to protect 
public morals, discourage products of prison labor, or accommodate 
that member's own laws and regulations. Helms-Burton qualifies under 
all three exceptions. 
The Helms-Burton Act also comports with NAFTA, although it is an 
admittedly closer case. NAFTA, similar to GATT, allows its members to 
. avoid their obligations in certain circumstances. While Canada and 
Mexico charge that Title IV's immigration provisions violate NAFTA's 
liberalized regime for business immigration, Helms-Burton's immigra-
tion restrictions are permissible under NAFTA Chapter 16. Under this 
chapter, Helms-Burton may deny entry to business persons if these 
business people are not "otherwise qualified" under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952. Since the INA allows the United 
States to exclude those seeking entry for national security grounds, the 
United States could justify Helms-Burton's immigration restrictions 
along those lines. Rather than following this course, the United States 
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should amend the INA specifically to include theft or conversion of 
stolen property among its national security exclusions. 
Congressional enactment of the Helms-Burton Act is a crucial step 
in redressing extensive U.S. property claims. More importantly, the 
Helms-Burton Act will be instrumental in accelerating the fall of Cas-
tro's regime. By discouraging foreign investment in Cuba, the Act will 
deprive Castro of the hard currency he needs to sustain his regime and 
will pressure him into respecting fundamental human rights. In the 
end, the Helms-Burton Act represents a significant step toward pro-
moting democracy in Cuba and will ensure Cuba's long-term prosper-
ity as a democratic nation after the demise of the Castro regime. 
David M. Shamberger 
